Prof. Ulises A. Faúnde

Prof. Ulises A.  Faúnde. Geographer, M.A. International Studies(Univ. of Chile), Diplomas in: Remote Sensing and Outer Space Policy and Military uses(France Space Agency),Technological Strategy and Defense (Armed Forces University  R.O.C.-Taiwan), Outer Spacer Law,(Univ. of Chile) Technology Management (Armed Forces University R.O.C.- Taiwan) and   National Security (ANEPE-Chile).Academic Member of the University of Chile at the Strategic Studies Area.

 

I. INTRODUCTION

The vanguard technology of our time is specially influent and able to change the information analysis process to produce intelligence and to help the decision makers work specially in fields like: public policy, environment and critical communications, because the new instruments, principally related with computing and data files managements support, pointing to better perform diverse prospective and linkage works, today normally accepted, but almost impossible to imagine 30 years ago.  

Nevertheless, their effectiveness and transcendence are not only a technological progress expression, but a projecting of a new civilization way for the policy, the culture, the natural processes and social life, specially challenge in developing areas, because the knowledge obtained through the use of the new instruments, has exposed the new global phenomena of the mankind progress and  provided a new line of work for the Political Science, the Strategy and the Intelligence: the sensitive information criteria, a singular and new perspective of the data performing.

 

II. TECHNOLOGY AND SENSITIVE INFORMATION

“Sensitive Information” is all data, information, knowledge or intelligence products, crucial for a person, group, country, country block or important enterprise, in one moment or during a crisis situation. It means that the same information may be only a current fact for another, without the same gravitation to their interest.

Then, for instance, if an outer space information product give the opportunity to increase or to loose national power level, the intelligence analysts  are involved within a sensitive information issue; it must  be resolved then, by means of other technology systems or other instruments, but  inside the same “ information cycle”, but with a new methodology and procedures.

For developing countries, those phenomena must be enclosed as a principal issue for their national strategic develops planning and to consider the following specific topics, because it involves a wide fluent goals and scopes:

• Increasing National Information Capability.
• Creating bases for economic development.
• Providing directly benefits to the people.
• Helping in natural and human disasters and emergency circumstances.
• Doing more transparent the “decision making” process.
• Relating “flexible insertion “with the best performing decision.
• Providing fictional information scenarios to evaluate decisional alternatives.
• Combining technological source information with other public available sources to obtain a synergy relation.
• Supplying real time data for competitive analysis systems whose applications are almost boundless.
• Increasing National Power.

Because leaders of the governments want and need to know what is really happening with certain issue or struggle, outside their bureaus,- information systems and related support technologies are providing critical information in real time, to threaten, to determine or to support the best solution way, in one critical moment.

The value of quickly access to “sensitive information” product, derived from any border technology systems, will be directly related with the importance and of decisions needed, supported by that class of information. Then, it’s a critical and strategic level issue to understand and to test it, in their possibilities, from a different technological perspective, respecting the developing countries perspective.

Thanks this border technology, today is very clear. It even in the long terms to measure the technological distance effects,  because it exist the idea that the political stability is an impassable requirement for the development of the sciences and the scientists, outside the  power countries . The problem is to determine the threshold and a conceptual frame for it, thinking in the objective conditions of institutional efficiency and the comparative parameters to determine it.

About this, it is necessary to discuss the constituent elements, to evaluate factors and to plan goals to conclude and to infer the ideal way, setting become to define the best. At the same time, the spreading of the general idea  about Latin America continent as the “promised land” for technology products like outer  space ones and other advanced computing sellers, locating this kind of issue in the first priority of study to include the continental market, its dynamic and  parameters. Several transnational holdings expect, that the moment to promote their products and service lines. The relation cause-effect in this field of geo-economic domain, must  be explained, thinking in the real needs of “our continent”, the nature of  “our problems” and the diversity and unequal class of “our countries”, as well  as their public policies and technological border expectancy.

The process of technological development in Latin America is Unequal between countries ; that explain the different styles and policies, to enclose it, inside the “tool set” information for entering modernity era. The technological distance from the power countries and the “no-clear reasons” to exploit the border technologies  inside the local policies, are the regarding four decades of technological “career”. The new century and millennium, the new conceptions about the role of computing and the outer space information products, to help the developing process and the demonstration effect of its potentialities, are enough motives to   verify their technology reality concept,  as a future way and a future  challenge for this class of countries, with their own perspective. The questions is:  which would be the best form to employ it successfully?

Then, a new perspective of strategic issues is being caused by the fast emerging of technological policy  frame, like a “revolution without doctrine”. Nevertheless, this change in the strategic world view is supported on a  new model of the super power scope: the new “soft power”, replacing the old “hard power”, maybe since the big stick steak  heritage?

The actual front of the border technology, specially its flashing star : the outer space  domain is now a real tool of influence, a real intelligence power source  and an economical lever to create a new state of  the art in the political arena.  That trouble must be specially thought by the governments of the undeveloped countries and, one answer may be the “flexible insertion” model: “ the use of the free market to exert the freedom to choice  the most suitable tech-line for each   country or allied countries”.

Then , this challenge for the developing countries tells us that through History, the maximum  “Information is  Power”, continue like a tithe been a big truth but with a new performance “intelligence is power”, because the increasing distance between  power countries and the rest of the world  is an indisputable reality . Now, at the beginning of the XXI century, “sensitive information” products has taken a profile and  has been increased and powerful, mainly when is allied  with the border technology, because the new instruments, like outer space ones, are able to capture and to transmit in real time, information volumes as never was possible to do before, principally  useful to intelligence analysis and so.

Now, the problem is how the undeveloped countries can insert themselves in this new form of world power balance, in this new feedback role between information theory, data file banks, intelligence management and capture data, by means of sophisticated instruments  and its technical organizations. As an example, a country territory has a special and unique location in the Earth planet; for this reason, its outer space exploitation procedures must concern it by a lot of associated motivations: orbital flat, satellites trajectory in the pole orbit, continental position, real need of space communication to obtain real time links and the strategic location to access the another continent, and their position respect the ocean of the world. All these phenomena must be added to the historical heritage and the development of an increasing flow of communications by several means: ships, airplanes and satellite bonds. Then, the political geography patterns, increased by the advanced border technologies, propose a new challenge for the theoreticians of a new subject:  The “Geo-Technological Policy” definition.

Since the new conceptual challenge perspective, derived in the new ERA, the general meaning about it is   that the traditional concepts of political and strategic issues are unable to produce valuable answers into the new track of the historical time: the XXI century, one period where the fast process and the giddy speed change are the principal parameters of the human life.

To solve the emergent new problems, it is necessary to understand the new reality; a general political and economical realignment like the signature of the rolling process.  Perhaps the power countries are supposing the future must  be conquered now, in the present; nevertheless, the success may be not the only goal: the principal objective maybe to  establish a new kind of political and strategic world balance, to join the rest of the world in a new techno-economic deal, to expand sure markets and, to solve the principal question: what’s the ideal of technological support for the policy models in the new  international world order?

All  these  problem components are challenges for the Statecraft, for the Intelligence Agencies (in their analysis job) and for the creative capability of the best minds,  mean-while the vortex of the world process doesn’t stop; on the contrary, to speed up the technological rhythm and the live style of mankind is a riddle, perhaps like a speed cards game,  the traditional analysis models would be unable and obsolete; in that  case, it is essential to promote new strategic and technological procedures and methodologies, fit to give the answers required by a disconcerted world, searching in the middle of a quick flow  and having the change like the stability signature with new competitive  frameworks and  intelligence products requirements.

That is the real nature of the technological impact for the “sensitive information” challenge and those are the multiple questions, waiting for real answer, waiting  for  an intelligence analysis enlightenment process, wherever the circumstances require it. Then, it would be useful to prepare the new analysts (the experienced even) thinking in the new sceneries because it’s essential to perform into the unavoidable, to picks about the intelligence methodology advances.

 

III. LATIN AMERICA: SEARCHING THEIR “TECHNO-INTELLIGENCE” TRACK

The technological revolution before described and their complex related phenomena, has obtained a goal for the civilization but, at the same time, has produced a new form of difference between two types of countries:  the masters of the systems and the simple users or targets, in balance with the open world doctrine and real access  to the information obtained.

At the same time, since the point of view of International Relations and Diplomacy theory, the systematic use of increasing computing systems, to support the intelligence analysis activities, helps the decision makers in all strategic focus domain, like economy, national power, natural resources and all  potential and real capabilities of a Nation-state to perform and to enforce the power of the government procedures, when several technological lines uncover strategic situations and action lines, pointed to justify power projects and hegemonic  perspectives.

All of these, the super power (countries or blocks) are able to trespass the sovereignty of all the world countries and to know about the people, the landscape and the communications flow, as never before was possible to access.                     

In each country, specially in the developing nation-state the presence and action of outer space prospective and computing linkage action, has created a new class of challenge, a situation revealing the increasing differences between levels of border technology capabilities.

Then, there will be  the creative ability of their managers and political guides the crucial factor to determine the useful tools to evaluate the future process. The political conduction of this complex problem is crucial to point the  political way,  to choose and to decide the future lines with a logical perception of a developing world. Developing  countries, specially in Latin America, have understood the increasing importance of this macro technological line and all that kind of countries are willing, ready to invest, as a way to obtain benefits of the border technology; but, at the same time, there exists the  potential problem of a new domain form that, generation to generation in the  technological career, push the need to “modernize” and to give it national strength and to project regional techno-policies, to “obtain  something” in the technological field and to help them like a “panacea” for better human welfare. The Latin American general developing level is not an homogeneous model; several countries have invested a lot of money to solve problems in basic infrastructure, poverty suppression and health lack, but they must  be able to use the emerging technology, moreover to help in the solutions about it. Other countries are searching alternative ways to access that domain in association with the principal country powers, focused to make secure certain technological level. It Is the typical situation of the south center countries in south American continent. They have made growing efforts to consolidate a certain level of self-developing like a process, sometime through the critical mass of scientists or through important investment in research projects, pointed to ensure certain strategic technology level domain, or to satisfy focused issues, like progressive “Amazonian destruction” in Brazil, the drastic weather changes of “La Pampa”  in Argentina or “el niño” in the coast line of Chile and Perú.

Both class of problems maybe influence their natural technological domain to insert them in the world and to gain status in the regional and international security scene. Their aim is to build and to organize a progressive regional technology profile, thinking to obtain the best help for the regional and local problems solutions line, as an efficient tool to project technology, like a public policy instrument with a social investment support.

At the same time, other Latin American countries want to modernize their communication systems, to help the most dynamic and profitable business with this domain. It is not a secret  that the transnational enterprises are picking up their communication markets, into a silent economic war to obtain the control of conventional telephones, cell-telephones and International connections, because it’s a great and increasing business.

Then, the wide Latin-America challenge is to design a civilization highway, perhaps with a continue searching of the future possibilities; perhaps the own line, may be a new joint venture perspective with the super-powers, but searching with a permanent open spirit, pointed to walk in the border technologies specially computing and outer space domain, with an own profile, but without to loosing the logical issues of the beginning in the world technology race, when the super powers did compete for political prestige and  the principal objective was the investment to build and to maintain technological  field of influence.

Samsung up capitol  questions about the role and advantage of border  technology  for

 these countries future continuing preoccupying them :

• Which are their  current benefits for the region?
• What would be the difference between to have and to have not, a technological policy place related with the emergent Intelligence work agencies?
• Which would be the social impacts consequences?
• Which political levels will receive hardly the Intelligence support of  this field?
• Which will be the best creative forms to project the goals of the border technology since the scientific domain to the common people?
•   What is the matter with the new technologies developing lines, for the region.
• Are the super power able to transfer the most sensitive instrument and expertise in these domains?  When?
• Which are the price and the cost to search a new way to confront the technology issues or problems as a general prospective matter? 

Questions are simple and clear; the answers very difficult because there exists several options, and the performances of these countries political systems are not yet so able to support this type of effort. A first conclusion may be : “we did arrive later, then we have lost time but, at the same time, we have the opportunity to avoid original mistakes”. Alone or like a block, these countries are facing a second dilemma;   which must to be the basic concepts to define their border technological insertion?, specially in accordance with  Intelligence requirements?                 

The answers go through the common interest definition, the general ideas about international trade and the logical agree of the reality: the iron circle of backwardness is strong, very difficult to break, and only a strong political decision can reverse revert that situation, like an international change; each moment with increasing speed in this field, they maintain  the level of targets and simple users  of the products, offered by superpowers. Then, the only way to crash that objective reality is to define basic criteria’s ; the most important , in author’s option , is the FLEXIBLE INSERTION, where the countries and the regional blocks don’t sign closed contracts with only one super-power or transnational enterprises, like an exclusivity condition. The idea is to  know widely to better decide, to explore, to better evaluate and, to offer investment possibilities but NEVER SIGN with only one of them a permanent contract , because that’s the best way to increase the dependence and take a new way to an international subordination relationship. The super powers scope is respectable but developing countries are living another class of problems, from another perspective, in a different period of the civilization time-line. Only a healthy synergy” that consider the national interest in accordance with the collective imaginative interest expressions would be able to combine future perspectives and realities.

The International Outer Space law and another technological regulations are not able to give solutions in this context, because the goal is to generate sensitive information to help  the  political decision level, while the technological distance between the different class of countries continue in progress, perhaps determining the horizontal cooperation type,  would be an option to be explored in order to transfer technological knowledge with an important rank of certitude. Nevertheless, one of the principal policy makers dilemma  is:  how to transfer the more suitable  vanguard technology products to the mass populations of “our poor countries”?. The matter is to generate a positive spin to promote positive technological effects to the people with a cooperation criteria, to generate a positive synergy between the social actors. That’s a great intelligence field issue.

Since the last years of the 50’ decade, the transfer process of border  technologies, from the super-power to developing countries, has been “special”; by one side has been simple, limited and expensive, perhaps useful? ; in another perspective has been innovative, pragmatic and useful, but always in the scientific level, using the universities and state bureaus like consignee.   Only in the last decade the private enterprise criteria has arrived like a new optional mode to expand several branches, such as  the outer space and computing dissemination products. Why? maybe because the wall of secrecy has persisted and the scope of the private enterprise arrived later in these fields.

Latin America is now facing how to use it with a different priority, to solve a wide problem’s gamma, (not only poverty), and this subject is a complex challenge to organize and to priories only in order to help and support the national and regional development policies. However, each country of Latin America is different to the others; it exist a diversity, unified only by the common language, generally the same religion, with an historical Iberian heritage; but the technological phenomena is a new one, it is an external element trying to engage with historical process, with singular ways of life, perhaps as a link between  developing states and the world speed of the technological evolution.

Each of this kind of countries is searching, all the time, the best way to access the border line technology for their national developing process, but the “struggle” is: investment needs funds to buy, -in the international market -, but also funds to create a critical mass of specialists and experts. Only the owner of the information management “secrets” is able to give them the real prospective view; only a shrewd user is able to demand the precise equipment in the specific time, for a clear and present class of use.

The break point  is, then, for all  Latin American countries: to define the different technology  policy levels, to explain to people the benefits related, and to provide the facilities and laws to reinforce the interactive possibilities pointed to prospect the future, to generate a cooperative environment and to require the past experience, ever valuable to help the  societies and  peoples to value the peaceful uses of technological lines like a challenge, with creative spirit, from the state system perspective or from the private enterprise focus. Both of them are valid, and it is suitable to appreciate them working together, to protect and to increase the national and regional power, in an agreement of faith, in the leadership public policy role and the support of a new expression of social investment, a new track to confront the future without to forget the roots of a complex dilemma: the sensitive character of these peculiar information sources, using the definition of “sensitive information” like an input for Intelligence process. Then, the new Analyses intelligence perspective, would be beginning to be defined.

 

IV. THE INTELLIGENCE ANSWER LINE

• “New technological-intelligence models, in accordance with new strategic patterns will be per harps able to find a new perspective of our deep nature: the fundamental nature of  Mankind”.

“It exist a new state of the art in the Strategic Intelligence and analysis procedures”. These phrases are not only typical displays of modernity costume; they are an easy checking proof to understand the incoming of a new step, in long term of the Intelligence stairways, even, from since the knowledge theory to the methodology frame : about it, obviously the questions are ever more than the answers, because:

• How the Intelligence analysis must to confront the new relevant parameters of the modernity challenges?
• How will must to change the Intelligence analyst focus, from a bipolar schema toward a diffuse multipolar international game?
• Which will be the most relevant technological procedures and cognitive methodology able to expand the mind capabilities of the thought?…

The satisfactory answer to these and another similar questions, are related with the analytic epistemology and must focused into the real  perceptions world, the essence of the human cognitive process and the reinforced function of a stressed human brain.

Intelligence analysis work continues increasing its capital importance, searching the relationships between an enormous quantitative and deep qualitative levels of complexity, to produce integrated   analysis with a full knowledge bases. Then, several analysis models are prescribing, because they are unable to solve the new fast-breaking line, running  Intelligence and policy; then it’s necessary to address all the plausible premises, within a new solid expertise thought process: that’s the real new challenge. However, to prepare the analysts of developing countries (new and experienced) to work in these different scenes, it’s essential to perform in the following inescapable objectives:

1. to construct methodologies, focused on solid expertise, plausible premises and own models, adaptable to the dynamics of any class of process.
2. to determine flexible lines of procedures,  to prevent failures and  to protect the analysis models from the pitfalls, endemic phenomena in the human thought process.
3. to be able to design primary analytic mechanisms, to process information, evaluating and regulating significant cultural elements,  defining analysts themselves.
4. to develop process sets, making their parts of a modern mental design, where intelligence analysts will be self-conscious about prospective reasoning processes.
5. to establish a profitable relation between the technological software, the instruments of reason and the scientific method, because only a thoughtful analyst can  give power to the critical minds, able to project the intelligence as a supreme device.
6. to design a new “deal line”  between the intelligence users and readers, focused on to clarifying the more rigorous products, necessary to increasing the analytic standards, a new corporate tradecraft challenge and, – ensure an assessing-, complex but usefully, for the client or customer.
7. To assist the policy making process, modifying the use of science, technology, philosophy, intelligence judgment methodology and early warning doctrine,  with alternative offers of different scenarios, to determine higher standards in the cognitive tool use and exploring all possible alternative interpretations.
8. To encourage products to clearly delineate  chains of inference , in symbiosis with creativity and alternative analytic debates,  competitive analysis models and adequate expertise to manage them.
9. To perceive the world through clear lenses, to consider carefully plausible hypotheses and their compatibility with substantive and organized processes.
10. To establish a new organizational environment, expanding the mental process and fostering development of tools, deriving incisive finding from information to awareness.
11. To determine new sources of analysis failures, proposing a new analytical tradecraft toolkit, for all the intelligence analysts. They must learn to do, to achieve the highest possible level of  excellence, beyond knew performances.

The traditional concepts of political and strategical Intelligence are notable to produce a valuable answer in a new type of historical time: the XXI century, one period where the fast process and the technological change are the principal motive parameters for the human life. Then,  to solve the new problems, it’s necessary to understand the new reality: a general political and economical realignment as the “signature” of the process; perhaps the power countries are supposing the future must  be conquered now, in the present, but the success may be not the only goal: the principal objective for the developing countries must be the establishment of a new kind of political and strategic harmony balance, to join the rest of the world in a new techno-economic deal, to expand the markets and to solve the principal question : what’s the ideal of  world  model for the perception of each class of country?.

All  these components became challenges for the Intelligence Statecraft, then for the analysts job and creative capability of their minds, mean while the vortex of the world’s process doesn’t stop; on the contrary , to speed up the technological rhythm and the live style of Mankind is a riddle, perhaps like a seed cards game.

Then, one checks that the traditional analysis models way be unable and obsolete; in that case, it is essential to promote new Intelligence Procedures and Methodologies, fit to give the answers required by a disconcerted world, searching in the middle of a quick flow and, having the change like the stability signature with new competitive frameworks and Intelligence requirements, that’s the real nature of the Intelligence challenge and multiple questions, waiting for real answers and for an enlightenment process, wherever the circumstances require it. To prepare the new analysts class, using any new methodologies to confront the reality before profiled, it is necessary to think and to answer within that new scenery; then  it’s essential to perform into the following inescapable topics:

1. To understand the structural parameters of the near political-strategic future, their principal subjects,  issues and the nature of the voids.
2. To develop  new analysis models, able to support and to confront the new reality with new conceptual frames, new ideas and creative manners, able to achieve levels of excellence, beyond that will became naturally.
3. To carry on, in the general world realignment in new strategic blocks, knowing economical and technological potentialities to understand new eco-political blocks of interest, enforcing the applied research to know the new materials and economical analysis models for access to the vortex of the new trade system.
4. To prospect the future options of the developing countries  all over the world, thinking in their joint, inside the new international security system.
5. To study new and emergent conflict profile theory and the new conflict setting , since the scope of the foreign relations, between countries and alliances.
6. To test new prototypes of analysis procedures, from the point of view of the philosophy, epistemology, social sciences, counter  intelligence and political sciences, focusing in the potential  contributions to adjust a new analysis methodology, with the technological software’s, hardware’s,  reality simulation instruments and alternative running settings.
7. To project  national and regional power with the economic relations  in the Asia Pacific basin, the new greatest market of the world, considering of the real inequalities between the North and the South   types of countries, the natural resources reserves and the distributive population entry and their life quality. 
8. To study the new forms and expressions of terrorism phenomena, from the  chemical arms, to the secret attack of hackers and crackers, their political and economics roots and effects, their projective roles and  the structure of new vulnerability “scenes”.
9. To measure the new expressions of poverty and wealth, at the shade of new classes of social profit, sharing in a technological and real time links of the international society.
10. To transform the aim of National Interest and National Security concepts, as a logical strategic consequence of the crisis in the sovereignty real validity, the emergence of new tendencies, where the diplomatic styles are being displaced by the pragmatic relations, supported in the reciprocal interest and a new emergent political realism.

 

V. PRACTICAL APPROACH

Finished the developing before explained ideas, it’s possible to propose a crucial  question ¿How the Intelligence analysts principally in developing countries, will be able to find their new enclose role, inside and outside of the decision making circle?

Possible Answer: maybe thanks to the help of any new procedure perspective “analysis model”, where technological products and political science theory support and generate new “work models”. We think in something like a “DIAMOND”, -a  volumetric diagram model -, representing  graphically the processing work making, possible to inspire our own soul, to produce much and more.  (see Figure Nº 1).

The  idea about the DIAMOND diagram is based on a simultaneous work line, understood though not stated that levee the author  doesn’t propose a new analysis methodology, but a different theory approach to the processing organized work. This may be a new way of team  labor, behind of the work methodology of the analysts index to use diary. In this  sense, it means searching and to manage most efficiently the team labor of Intelligence Production, pointing to step the data and information flow derived through technology means, phenomena known as “organizational learning”;  in short, better ways to move “intangible actives”, but gifted of high potential, essential feature of the sensitive information. 

The emergent Intelligence Agencies (in developing countries) must  assume that their physical  actives are unable to generate all kind of “intangible actives” by their self, that support the real  incorporate value in the final product,  providing by their organizations to the user. Then,  ¿are  these capabilities enough to create value not really countable? The objective is to obtain learning capabilities in the organization level that increase the speed and the value of “intelligence- product”, offered like a finished product, derived from a new structured process, convening human processing expertise, highly competence with flexibility structure to confront diverse situations.

The idea is to understand that the intellectual value of the analysts corp. is a concept very difficult to measure through conventional parameters, mind models or mind organization models. Then, to mobilize these ideas, is necessary to define the objectives forms to became that process and that will explain the reach and the results about a class of focus here named “diamond”. This alternative model may be a new perspective since the emergence of the traditional linear approach with their meticulous execution and observance, been  possible to determine conclusions, possibilities and course of actions, about any phenomena, process or personal behavior (see Figs. Nº 2 and 3).

 

The searching point is to incise in the level of the information management to make  more easy the work of intelligence  production shorting the work times  and to promote a better  management of the analytical groups, so  difficult to organize and to maintain. All of these reasons are proposed in the, to establish that in the  processing level coexist the Science and the Technique as  knowledge tools and sources, but  maintaining the transversal mode with the  empiric data and the  material produced, thanks to the models and  principles, given by the  scientific disciplines. If the most dynamic  perform factor is the  technological itself , here consider, all before explanation can  be  right. It conserves the “file” and “user” parameters, because they represent the concerning start and destination of an Intelligence process, maintaining intact their own  nature.

A second concept level of reflection is represented  by the  “Intelligence Organization Model” where coexist: structure and feedback capabilities, in a border balance with capability and mobility of the available means, delimited in time and space by the opportunity and guidance concepts into the Intelligence labor. Then, to carry out all previous, it is necessary an  environment work properly lead, in accordance with the logic of the work sketch before explained . That, promote the idea to enforce a production director, in charge of Operational systems, before defined, in balance with classification and systems, drivers by strategic and institutional frame, like strategic function inside the processing stage.

Finally, in the operational foreground, will must to exist several “Analysis Group Chiefs” , when a senior analyst is in charge of a processing work with a great specialized analytical groups experience, in a number and size in accord with the complexity of each theme or study area. Applying  the detail of before ideas, in the holistic and convergent scope, it is possible to example it from different perspectives, but complementary angles; between them it is possible to emphasize practical reality approaches to practice and to work together, searching and evaluating information to produce INTELLIGENCE. The principal issues and convergence focus to prove our general methodological idea may be:

 

A. Process Analysis Group, in balance with an internal composition, able to detach a process in their dynamic, in their synergy extension and  harmonized with the systemic variable search ( if it exists)   within the studying complex. The relation between “Messages  and  Symbols”  are break up simultaneously with the contents and semantic. Data  bases and users and irremovable constants.

B. Comparative Analysis Groups, where it exist situation’s analysis with actors analysis, compared in expressions and procedures of critical methodology, supported on structured designs, indicators and profiles of  each one, when  a compared factor role inside the hole.

C. Reality Analysis Groups, as well as “one moment” rigid  situations, with independent variability and speed, to study time-frames, specially projected to “policy of geographical space” and management territory  environment, in the space- time perspective. At the same time, is possible to develop comparative analysis with holistic models, searching the feasibility  to understand a complex reality from a non temporal scope, where design and method are enable to approximate the reality in a comparative style with the vortex between static perception and dynamic complex.

D. Scenery Analysis  Group, where each analysis team makes apply or rescue an scenery type, spearing carefully factors and elements to understand the flow of the process and then, makes the possible measures between reality projections and  reality parameters, creating points of view and options to help the user or decision maker. In  this case, the analysts must  be assembles thinking in the class of scenery , ( more probably, more risk, more easy to make it ), and the group members are motivated to refine their arguments to support their  focus, all of these in the idea to offer the user the best possible   number of operational lines, all possible ideas pointed to make them  practical,  and later, to promote the clearest to the decision makers.

Moreover, since a convergence perspective, the fourth previous examples  may be related themselves between each other, performing and enforcing new perspective of an Analysis Department work methodology, specially thinking in the developing  countries reality their focus must be to define the real premises , able to unify a creative style of work, supporting on several irreducible concepts, here specified:

• a knowledge solid base, very difficult to destroy.
• a hierarchies scale of value attributes, to establish their borders, in accord with the superior national interest serving by the Organization.
• a progressive improvable of the technological knowledge, able to inform about the characteristics and progress of this macro-variable.
• an open creative space principle, evicting decrease complexity, even  when it is necessary to imagine the become process, signals and behavior useful to remark the future.                

 

Organizing that as “quadrilateral”, it is possible to center in a new focus the global production process schema of the Intelligence machine, where the general ideas drive the best way to transform the complex reality into a handful product for authorities like Users: All those reasons, resources  and capabilities are here organized like a methodological  class of work, favoring  the feedback and simultaneity, aiding to better profile the following specific conclusive concepts:

1. The incorporation of new methods and perform lines of work to increase the “optimum “ of the analytical labor and to define the Intelligence Organization Profile.
2. The human resources and its ability to project their  original labor frame, are  according with the general strategy and the outstanding of the Organization records. It’s the difference between the “want to do” and the aim “power for being able.
3. The post-effect of the Intelligence-Product will be a function and result of the internal experience, project capabilities and credibility in the political level of the Agency.
4. The “ intangible actives” of an Intelligence Organization, are founded priority in the management capacity, the level of knowledge obtained and its analysis quality.
5. The ANALYSTS are the intellectual capital , an irreducible property of any  Intelligence Organization, as well as their search men because, from the point of view of the strong impact  of the news technologies, they must  be able to find the essence constituents between the possibilities and a great variety of foreign stimulus.
6. The schema’s changes proposed in “diamond” is not a “revolutionary analysis challenge “  for the developing countries intelligence systems; it is only an analysis function model, trying to improve the learning organizational process, the management of the analytical job and the protection of the intellectual capital, to maintain and to go up the intelligence-product quality.
7. The new emergent technologies allow the sophisticate representation of great organized data volumes and information’s that, in another way of process, would be very difficult to process and to obtain benefits.
8. The new technology use, can  potency, or interfere depending on the value of the data; then, more sophistication in the intelligence product, means more challenge for the analysts in their work, withdrawing the essence from the superfluous material.
9. Technologies, like phenomena, are paradoxes them self : give a current of information, but don’t produce methodology to guide their own process. They carry on a double condition of “revolution” into the analytical work : the dilemma between everlasting spreading and dialog trouble. That mean the increasing black box phenomena, going on the human process and acquisition must  be clarify to go out the data volume mud hole ; the sign it exist but to separate it from the noise, making difficult the job and the time that’s ever scarce.
10. Diverse sources and changing interest centers must  find a convergence place, specially in the sensitive affairs for persons, enterprises, organizations, countries or regional blocks. About it, it is recommendable the data base connection, but with a clear objective to avoid non productive search.
11. The proposal modifications must  help in the methodology search, the evolutional organizations and necessary changes in the estimate process, because the obsolete procedures are a very dangerous trouble. It is the search of the chronological opportunity over a distressing situation. 

 

VI. CONCLUSIONS

• The global environmental reality of the developing countries, relating with intelligence affairs, shawls a big difference with the developed ones : a tradition inside and outside the Intelligence domain, circumstance able to point and to define a new way for the analysis work, because it is indispensable to accept the realities and historical heritages as different, even if the state of the art, in the methodological level, continuing evolving, associated directly with the technological progress.
• The exploitation of the technological advances into the informatics field is useless if the product’s processing doesn’t transit through the analysts minds, well disposed to innovate with creativity in the methodological domain and the proceeding way, because the real dilemma is to give the best Intelligence-product in the shortest time, inside an increasing data volume, reflecting the national reality or an specific one.
• The DIAMOND analytical intelligence perspective method, is pointed to conform an adaptable creation, searching to congregate and to coordinate convergence aspects of an study issue, trying to optimize the information available. Nevertheless, the technological support is playing here the most important and essential role, if the searching labor attempt the best data combine, either all possible and feasible for the go on a phenomena or process.      
• Developing countries, arriving later at the Intelligence world, must  be able to use specialized software and hardware of commercial level, never designed to serve the Intelligence labor. The principal idea will be then, enforce the power of the Intelligence art, their analytic process and the develop a guess right methodology, to link both components. The general idea, pointing to reduce the real distance between both country Intelligence level, to serve with efficiency their government structure or to work efficiently in the private enterprises environment, to feedback both of them and to obtain a real synergy between two parallel types of points of view, but ever servants of their National Interest.

 

VII. REFERENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY

• Academic American Encyclopaedia. Online Edition. Under “Pragmatism,” Downloaded from Prodigy, Rockville. MD: Grolier Electronic Publishing, 1993), 1993.
• Barzun, J. and Henry F. “The Modern Researcher”.New York:Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers, 1985.
• Ben-Zivi, A. “Hindsight and Foresight: A Conceptual Framework for the Análisis of Surprise Attacks,” World Politics. April 1976, 386.
• Betts, R K. “Analysis, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable.”  Studies in Intelligence, Fall 1979, 35-54.
• Boatner, Helene L.  “The Evaluation of Intelligence.” Studies in Intelligence. Summer 1984, 65-75.
• Brei, William S. “Assessing Intelligence by Principles of Quality: The Case Study of Imagery Intelligence Support to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.” Unpublished thesis. Washington DC: Defense Intelligence College. July 1993.
• Brody, Richard. “The Limits of Warning” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1983, 40-48.
• Capek, M. “Time.” Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas. Vol IV. Ed. by Philip P. Wiener. New York: Charles Scribner’s and Sons, 1973. 389-406.
• Carl, Leo D. The International Dictionary of Intelligence. McLean, VA: International Defense Consultant Services, Inc., 1990.
• Camer J. and Johnson E. “The Process- Performance Paradox in Expert    Judgement : How can Experts Know So Much and Predict So Badly?  in K. Ericsson and J. Smith eds.,  Toward a General Theory of Expertise: Prospects and Limits ( Cambridge,  UK : Cambridge University Press, 1991)
• Cartwright D. and Zander A., Group Dynamics: Research and Theory ( New York, NY : Harper & Row, 1960)
• Chi M., Feltovich P. and Glaser R., “Categorization and representation by Experts and Novices” Cognitive Science, vol. 5 , 1981, pp. 121-125.
• Davis, J. “Combating Mindset”. Studies in Intelligence. Winter 1991, 13-18.
• Evans J., “Bias in Human Reasoning, Causes and Consequences” ( Hove, UK: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1989);
• Faundez T. Ulises “Análisis de Información ”. Post Degree Document Nº 75. July 2000. Political Science Institute. University of Chile. Santiago. Chili.
• Fitz G, Constantine. “Intelligence for the Twentieth Century”. New York: Stein and Day, 1977.
• Ford, H.P. “Studies in Intelligence Salutes its Founder and Guiding Spirit: A Tribute to Sherman Kent.” Studies in Intelligence. Fall 1980, 1-8.
• Hastedt, C. “Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy: How to Measure Success.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence.  Spring 1991, 49-62.
• Heuer, Richards J., Jr. “Biases in Evaluation of Evidence.” Studies in Intelligence. Winter 1981, 31-46.
• __________. “Cognitive Biases: Problems in Hindsight Analysis.” Studies in Intelligence. Summer 1978, 21-28.
• __________. “Strategies for Analytical Judgment.” Studies in Intelligence. Summer 1981. 65-78.
• Heuer R. , Psychology of Intelligence Analysis ( Washington, DC: Centre for the Study Of Intelligence, 1999.
• Hemann, H. “The Intelligence-Policy Relationship. ”Studies in Intelligence. Winter 1984, 57.66.
• Jervis, R. “Puzzle and Paradox: Strategic Intelligence and Effective Policy.” Studies in Intelligence. Winter 1989, 17-27.
• Johnston R., Decision Making and Performance Errors in Teams : Research Results ( Arlington, VA : Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, 1997)
• Johnston R. and Fletcher J., A Meta- Analysis of the effectiveness of Computer-Based for Training ( Alexandria,VA : Institute for Defense Analyses, 1998)
• Kahneman D., Slovic P, and Tversky A, Judgement Under Uncertainty : Heuristics and Biases ( Cambridge,  UK  Cambridge University Press, 1982)
• Laqueur, W. “!The Uses and Limits of Intelligence.” New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1985.
• Letwin, S. “Certainty Since the Seventeenth Century.” Dictionary of the History of Ideas: Studies of Selected Pivotal ideas. Vol. 2 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973), 319.
• Lockwood J. and Lockwood K., “ The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction ( LAMP),” Defense Intelligence Journal, Vol.3,N° 2, 1994,pp.47-74; J.
• Macartney, J. “Intelligence and Bureaucratic Politics.” Studies in Intelligence. Spring 1989, 13-22.
• Paige J. and Simon H., “ Cognition Processes in Solving  Word Problems,” B. Kleinmuntz, ed., Problem Solving ( New York, NY Wiley, 1968 )
• Pelto, P.J. Anthropological Research: The Structure of Inquiry. New York: Haper and Row, 1970.
• Pieragostini, Karl “Assessing Intelligence.” Defense Intelligence College. USA. No date.
• Rand, A. Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology. New York: Mentor, 1979, 52-53.
• Sapp E., “ Decision trees,” Studies in intelligence, Winter, Vol. 18, 1974, pp. 45-57 ( declassified)
• Schum, D.A. Evidence and Inference for the Intelligence Analyst. Vol. 1. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987.
• Thompson, J.R., Hopf-Weichel R., and Geiselman R.E.. “The Cognitive Bases of Intelligence Analysis.” Research paper funded by the US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Centre, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, VA. Contract no. MDA 903-82-C-0409, OSD 1983.
• Troy, T. F. “The ‘Correct’ Definition of Intelligence.” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence. Winter 1991-1992, 433-454.
• Voss  J. and T. Post T.“On the Solving Structured problems,” M. Chi, R. Glaser, and M. Farr, eds,  New York. USA. 1998
• W. Chase and H. Simon, “ Perception in Chess”, Cognitive Psychology, Vol.4, 1973, pp. 51-81
• Zlotnick J., “ Baye’s Theorem For Intelligence Analysis,” H. Westerfield, ed., New York. USA.